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Private Enforcement of Competition Laws
Abstract
This article addresses a long-standing controversy in many antitrust/competition law regimes around the
world, including Canada, as to the appropriate role for private enforcement of competition laws. The United
States, from the origins of its antitrust law in 1890, has provided for an expansive role for private actions for
violations through treble damages remedies, class action procedures, one-way cost rules, contingent fees, and
civil jury trials. The Canadian experience has been sharply different: statutory recognition of any role for
private action occurred only in amendments to the Competition Act in 1976, and private damages actions
were confined to criminal violations of the Act. The Bureau of Competition Policy has recently proposed a
more expansive role for private actions under the Competition Act, in particular providing mechanisms for
private parties to have direct access to the Competition Tribunal in non-criminal matters. The authors review
the comparative experience with private antitrust enforcement; evaluate the arguments for and against the
private enforcement of public laws generally; and review theoretical debates over the role of private
enforcement of antitrust laws on either deterrence or compensation grounds. The authors conclude with a set
of procedural and remedial proposals designed to structure and discipline in appropriate ways a private
enforcement regime under the Competition Act
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PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF
COMPETITION LAWS©
By KENT ROACH* AND MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK**
This article addresses a long-standing controversy in
many antitrust/competition law regimes around the
world, including Canada, as to the appropriate role for
private enforcement of competition laws. The United
States, from the origins of its antitrust law in 1890, has
provided for an expansive role for private actions for
violations through treble damages remedies, class
action procedures, one-way cost rules, contingent fees,
and civil jury trials. The Canadian experience has been
sharply different: statutory recognition of any role for
private action occurred only in amendments to the
Competition Act in 1976, and private damages actions
were confined to criminal violations of the Act. The
Bureau of Competition Policy has recently proposed a
more expansive role for private actions under the
Competition Act, in particular providing mechanisms for
private parties to have direct access to the Competition
Tribunal in non-criminal matters. The authors review
the comparative experience with private antitrust
enforcement; evaluate the arguments for and against
the private enforcement of public laws generally; and
review theoretical debates over the role of private
enforcement of antitrust laws on either deterrence or
compensation grounds. The authors conclude with a
set of procedural and remedial proposals designed to
structure and discipline in appropriate ways a private
enforcement regime under the Competition Act
Cet article aborde une controverse de longue date
existant en droit de la comp6tition/antitrust A travers le
monde, y compris au Canada, concemant le r6le des
mesures priv6es de mise en application de la I6gislation
pertinente A ce domaine. Les ttats-Unis, depuis les
origines de leur loi antitrust en 1890, ont pris une
tangente vers la reconnaissance du r6le des recours
judiciares de nature priv6e, notamment par le biais de
dommages-int6r~ts triples, de proc6dures en recours
collectif, de r6gles pr6voyant la condamnation aux
d6pens par une partie spdcifique, d'honoraires fixes
selon un pourcentage et de proces civils devant jury.
L'expr!ience canadienne a 6t6 tres differente: un r6le
quelconque pour les actions priv6es a 6t6 introduit
seulement par les amendements a la Loi sur la
concurrence en 1976 et les recours priv6es en
dommages ont 6t6 limit6es aux violations pdnales de la
Loi. Le Bureau de la politique de concurrence a
r6cemment propos6 l'introduction d'un r6le 61argi pour
ces actions en permettant aux parties privdes d'avoir
acc6s au Tribunal dans les litiges de nature autre que
p6nals. Les auteurs soulignent l'exp6rience
comparative des mesures priv6es de mise en application
des lois antitrust, examinent les arguments des
protagonistes, et survolent les d6bats acad6miques sur
le r6le de celles-ci, que ce soit du point de vue de la
pr6vention ou de la compensation. En conclusion, les
auteurs sugg~rent des moyenas proc6duriers et curatifs
en vue de structurer et d'implanter, d'une mani~re
appropriee, un r6gime priv6 de mise en application de
]a Loi sur la concurrence
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I. INTRODUCTION
The role of private enforcement of competition/antitrust laws
has been the subject of long-standing and vigorous debates in many
jurisdictions throughout the industrialized world. In a 1995 Discussion
Private Enforcement of Competition Laws
Paper,' the Director of Investigation and Research of the Competition
Policy Bureau proposed a number of amendments to the Canadian
Competition Act.2 These proposals included the creation of a right of
direct access to the Competition Tribunal by private complainants with
respect to reviewable practices such as mergers, abuse of dominant
position, vertical distribution practices, and refusals to deal. The
proposals envisaged that private parties would only be entitled to the
same remedies as the Director (primarily injunctive relief), and that
mergers might be excluded from the private enforcement regime.
Following release of the Discussion Paper, the Director formed a
Consultative Panel to receive and review reactions to the proposals and
to advise the Director. The proposal for private party access to the
Competition Tribunal engendered substantial opposition from the
business and legal communities and within the Consultative Panel, which
recommended further study of the issue. The Bureau commissioned the
study from which this paper is derived, which was released in late
September 1996. Amendments to the Competition Act were introduced
into the House of Commons on 7 November 1996 (Bill C-67), but did
not include the proposed private party access regime. The Director
stated that the regime would remain under consideration, but action, if
any, would be deferred to subsequent amendment processes.
This article attempts to evaluate and advance the case for private
enforcement of competition/antitrust laws, 'and to develop a set of
procedural proposals that would govern such a regime. In Part II of the
paper we review the sharply divergent comparative experience in the
United States, Australia, and Canada with the private enforcement of
competition/antitrust laws. In Part III, we review the arguments for and
against private enforcement of public laws generally. In Part IV, we
review the arguments for and against private enforcement of
competition/antitrust laws specifically, and develop a corrective justice
case for specific and compensatory relief for private parties harmed by
competition law violations. In Part V, we sketch some procedural and
remedial ground-rules that, in our view, should govern private party
access to the Competition Tribunal with respect to reviewable practices
and perhaps also to criminal violations of the Competition Act. These
design features respond to the advantages and weaknesses of private
enforcement identified earlier in the article, and attempt to maximize
the potential for effective and efficient private enforcement of
1 Director of Investigation and Research, Bureau of Competition Policy, Discussion Paper on
Competition Law (28 June 1995) [unpublished].
2 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34 [hereinafter Competition Act].
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competition law while minimizing the risks of strategic behaviour that
could delay and hinder legal- and competitive behaviour.
II. THE COMPARATIVE EXPERIENCE WITH PRIVATE
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
Private enforcement of antitrust laws has a long history. The
U.K. Statute of Monopolies,3 enacted in 1623, provided that an
individual, financially injured in his business or property by a restraint of
trade, could bring suit and, if successful, collect treble the amount of his
damages from the perpetrator of the anti-competitive activity.4 More
generally, the common law of restraint of trade, whose genesis predates
even the Statute of Monopolies, has long recognized the right of private
parties to challenge unreasonable restraints of trade in contracts to
which they are parties (e.g. employment contracts, contracts for the sale
of a business) and restrictions on trade contained in by-laws or rules of
guilds and other trade associations with regulatory powers.5 This body
of doctrine also recognized, albeit in limited circumstances, the right of
private parties to maintain tort actions for conspiracy where they were
able to demonstrate injury from the collusive activities of other parties.
The courts, however, proved more willing historically to apply this
doctrine to the activities of trade unions than to business firms
conspiring to eliminate competitors through boycotts or other forms of
predatory behaviour.6
A. United States
In the United States, section 7 of the Sherman Act of 18907
provided that "any person who shall be injured in his business or
property ... by reason of anything forbidden ... by this Act may sue
3 An Act concerning monopolies and dispensations with Penal Laws and forfeitures thereof,
(U.K.), 21 Ja. 1, c. 3 [hereinafter Statute of Monopolies].
4 See K.G. Elzinga & W. Breit, The Antitrust Penalities: A Study in Law and Economics (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1976) at 63 [hereinafter Antitrust Penalties].
5 See M.J. Trebilcock, The Common Law of Restraint of Trade: A Legal and Economic Analysis
(Toronto: Carswell, 1986) c. 1.
6 Ibid. at 27-28.
7 An Act to Protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies, ch. 647, 26
Stat. 209 (1890) [current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1996)] [hereinafter Sherman Act].
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therefor ... and shall recover three fold the damages by him sustained,
and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Section 7 of
the Sherman Act has now been superseded by section 4 of the Clayton
Act of 1914,8 which enables private persons to bring antitrust suits for
treble damages for damage suffered as a result of any antitrust violation.
The Clayton Act also includes a one-way costs rule favouring plaintiffs.
It provides that final determinations resulting from prior government
enforcement proceedings are prima facie evidence of similar facts
alleged in subsequent antitrust proceedings.. In addition, section 16 of
the Clayton Act permits private parties who have suffered injury as a
result of any antitrust violation, or are threatened with injury, to seek
equitable relief from the courts, including, most prominently, injunctive
relief. In the United States, the treble damages remedy available to
private parties runs parallel to three classes of sanctions that may result
from public enforcement of the antitrust laws: fines, incarceration, and
structural remedies (such as divestiture).
Whether Congress, in enacting these provisions of the Sherman
and Clayton Acts, intended private actions to be the primary tool for
deterring anti-competitive activity or, instead, meant them merely to be
a device enabling the compensation of injured parties has been the
subject of some debate. Lack of any initial budgetary appropriation by
Congress for Sherman Act enforcement provides some support for the
former view, although during the first fifty years of Sherman Act
enforcement only 175 private suits were filed and, of these, the plaintiffs
were successful in only thirteen.9 More recent American experience
reflects a sharply different and larger role for private antitrust suits. A
1970 study by Richard Posner estimated that between 1890 and 1969,
9,728 private antitrust suits were filed in the United States and up to
1965, the ratio of private to government cases tended to be 6:1 or lessi 0
More recent empirical studies, including most prominently the
Georgetown Private Antitrust Litigation Project (the Georgetown
Project), which collected and analyzed data on all private antitrust cases
filed from 1973 to 1983 in five federal districts, found that from the mid-
1960s until the late 1970s, the absolute and relative number of private
antitrust cases grew, peaking at 1,611 in 1977, while the ratio of private
to public cases exceeded 20:1. In the 1980s, however, both the absolute
8 An Act to Supplement existing laws against unlawful Restraints and Monopolies, and for other
purposes, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) [current version at 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1996)] [hereinafter Clayton
Act].
9 Antitrust Penalties, supra note 4 at 66-68.
10 R.A. Posner, "A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement" (1970) 13 J.L. & Econ. 365.
1996]
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and relative numbers of private antitrust cases have declined, and the
ratio of private to public cases has fallen to the 10:1 range.1 In the
sample of cases analyzed in the Georgetown Project, horizontal price
fixing was the most frequent primary allegation, followed by refusal to
deal. When primary and secondary allegations were combined, refusal
to deal was the most frequent allegation, followed by horizontal price
fixing, tying or exclusive dealing, and price discrimination. Vertical
allegations outnumbered horizontal allegations. The largest group of
plaintiffs were downstream business entities-dealers, business
customers, franchisees, and licensees-suing their suppliers. The next
largest group of plaintiffs was competitors suing each other. Challenges
by competitors to mergers outnumbered those by suppliers, dealers and
customers by a ratio of 2:1. Of the cases for which the final disposition
was known, more than 80 per cent of the cases settled. Only 5.4 per cent
of all cases went to trial. While some estimates of private treble
damages actions filed in the United States before 1960 suggested that
about 75 per cent of all such actions were initiated after and in reliance
on similar government enforcement actions, data from the Georgetown
Project suggest that the average percentage of independently initiated
cases for the period 1973 to 1977 was 88.8 per cent and follow-on cases
11.2 per cent. For the period 1978 to 1983, the percentage of
independently initiated cases was 94.1 per cent and the percentage of
follow-on cases averaged 5.9 per cent.12
B. Australia
Prior to 1974, private statutory rights of action for breach of
prohibited restrictive practices were not recognized in Australia.
However, the Trade Practices Act 197413 provides that private parties
may bring proceedings before the Federal Court relating to restrictive
trade practices under Part IV of theAct. Remedies available to private
litigants include single damages; injunctions (except for mergers);
divestiture orders for mergers only; and other orders. The Federal Court
11 See S. Salop & L. White, "Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation" (1986) 74
Geo. L.J. 1001 at 1002; and H. Latimer, "Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Clause in the United
States-Is Reform Called For?" in R.S. Khemani & W.T. Stanbury, eds., Canadian Competition
Law and Policy at the Centenary (Halifax: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1991) c. 32, Table
1 at 667.
12 T. Kauper & E. Snyder, "An Inquiry into the Efficiency of Private Antitrust Enforcement:
Follow-on and Independently*Initiated Cases Compared" (1986) 74 Geo. L.J. 1163 at 1174.
13 Aust'l. 1974, no. 51 [hereinafter Trade Practices Act].
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of Australia Act 197614 also permits a person to bring a representative or
class action on behalf of others. According to a recent comment on the
Australian experience by David Smith,1 5 the Trade Practices
Commission actively encourages private actions as an alternative to
instituting proceedings itself. Over the period 1975 to 1994, seventy-nine
private actions were decided under the competition provisions of Part
IV of the Trade Practices Act, compared to sixty-one Commission cases.
About a third of the private actions related to secondary boycotts by
labour unions, which do not fall within the Canadian Competition Act.
Setting aside these cases, misuse of market power, anti-competitive
agreements and exclusionary provisions, and exclusive dealing are the
most common areas of private enforcement activity. In the Australian
experience, apparently, the type of practices or conduct where private
action has occurred or is most likely to occur involves some of the per se
breaches or the less complex rule of reason or abuse cases-that is,
conduct with immediate impact or detriment. Examples include refusal
to supply, boycott, supply on discriminatory terms, and blatant
misrepresentations in advertising or promotional material. Over the
entire period 1975 to 1994, private parties challenged only two mergers
by way of an application for a declaration, which may be followed by a
divestiture order. Injunctive relief is not available to private parties
seeking to oppose a merger. Smith claims that there is acceptance by all
stakeholders of the positive role that private enforcement has played in
the application of competition law in Australia, and that the right of
private action has complemented public enforcement and played a
significant role in enhancing the level of understanding of the Trade
Practices Act and the overall level of compliance within the business
community.
C. Canada
The historical experience has been sharply different in Canada.
The Combines Investigation Act,16 enacted in 1889, provided for no
private rights of action and recognized no such rights until the Act was
amended in 1976. However, the courts from an early date recognized
14 Aust'l. 1976, no. 156, as am.
15 "Private Rights of Action; Some Comments on the Australian Experience" (mimeo,
Australian Trade Practices Commission, undated).
16 An Act for the Prevention and Suppression of Combinations formed in restraint of Trade, S.C.
1889, c. 41 [hereinafter Combines Investigation Act].
1996]
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that an agreement in violation of the Act was invalid and unenforceable
as between the parties,1 7 and much more recently, they have recognized
that violations of the criminal provisions of the Competition Act may
provide the basis for common law tort actions for conspiracy or unlawful
interference with economic or contractual interests or relations.18
Similarly, some courts have suggested that in interpreting and applying
the common law of restraint of trade in a contemporary context, the
courts should be influenced by the objectives of the Competition Act,
particularly in applying the public interest (as opposed to parties'
interest) strand of the Nordenfelt common law restraint of trade test.1 9
However, the preponderance of opinion in recent case law is that the
reviewable practice provisions contained in Part VIII of the Competition
Act do not provide private parties with a basis for civil relief, because
they do not entail per se illegality,20 although this issue cannot yet be
regarded as conclusively resolved.
While the common law thus recognizes limited private rights of
actions in various contexts for anti-competitive practices, the process of
reforming Canada's competition laws began in 1969 with the publication
of the Economic Council of Canada's Interim Report on Competition
Policy.21 It focused significant attention on the question of whether a
more prominent role should be assigned to the private enforcement of
antitrust laws. The Council supported a larger role, and in 1971, its
views were adopted in Bill C-256 in the form of a double damages
provision modelled after the Clayton ACt.22 However, the Bill was
1 7 See Weidman v. Shragge (1912), 46 S.C.R. 1.
18 See Canada Cement Lafarge v. B.C. Lightweight Aggregat [1983] 1 S.C.R. 452; Westfair
Foods Ltd. v. Lippens Inc. (1989), 61 Man. R. (2d) 282 (C.A.); Direct Lumber Co. v. Western Plywood
Co., [1962] 2 S.C.R. 646; Valley Salvage Ltd. v. Molson Brewery B.C. Ltd. (1975), 64 D.L.R. (3d) 734
(B.C.S.C.); and Philco Products Ltd v. Thermionics Ltd., [1940] S.C.R. 501.
19 See Tank Lining Corp. v. Dunlop Industrial Ltd. (1982), 40 O.R. (2d) 219 (C.A.); and
Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns andAmmunition Co. Ltd., [1894] A.C. 535 (H.L).
20 See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Kimberley-Clark of Canada Ltd., (1991) 40 C.P.R. (3d) 1
(F.C.T.D.); R.D. Belanger and Associates Ltd. v. Stadium Corp. of Ontario (1991), 26 A.C.W.S. (3d)
509 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), rev'd 5 O.R. (3d) 778 (C.A.); Harbord Insurance Services Ltd. v. I.C.B.C.
(1993), 13 C.C.L.I. (2d) 262 (B.C.S.C.); Polaroid Canada v. Continent-Wide Enterprises Ltd. (1995),
59 C.P.R. (3d) 257 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)); and Cellular Rental Systems Inc. v. Bell Mobility Cellular
Inc. (1994), 116 D.L.R. (4th) 514 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), rev'd (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 766 (Div. Ct.).
21 Economic Council of Canada, Interim Report on Competition Policy (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1969).
22 Bill C-256, An Act to promote Competition, to provide for the general regulation of trade and
commerce, to promote honest and fair dealing, to establish a Competition Practices Tribunal, to repeal
the Combines Investigation Act and to make consequential amendments to the Bank Act, 3d. Sess.,
28th Parl., 1970-71.
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withdrawn in the face of intense business and political opposition, and in
the Stage I amendments to the Combines Investigation Act, enacted in
1976, a single damages remedy for breach of the criminal provisions of
the Act was adopted instead. This provision is now found in section 36
of the Competition Act, which provides as follows:
36.(1) Any person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of
(a) conduct that is contrary to any provision of Part VI, or
(b) the failure of any person to comply with an order of the Tribunal or another court
under this Act, may, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue for and recover from the
person who engaged in the conduct or failed to comply with the order an amount equal to
the loss or damage proved to have been suffered by him, together with any additional
amount that the court may allow not exceeding the full cost to him of any investigation in
connection with the matter and of proceedings under this section.
(2) In any action under subsection (1) against a person, the record of proceedings in any
court in which that person was convicted of an offence under Part VI or convicted of or
punished for failure to comply with an order of the Tribunal or another court under this
Act is, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, proof that the person against whom
the action is brought engaged in conduct that was contrary to a provision of Part VI or
failed to comply with an order of the Tribunal or another court under this Act, as the case
may be, and any evidence given in those proceedings as to the effect of those acts or
omissions on the person bringing the action is evidence thereof in the action.
(3) For the purposes of any action under subsection (1), the Federal Court is a court of
competent jurisdiction.
(4) No action may be brought under subsection (1),
(a) that in the case of an action based on conduct that is contrary to any provision of Part
VI, after two years from
(i) a day on which the conduct was engaged in, or
(ii) the day on which any criminal proceedings relating thereto were finally
disposed of, whichever is the later; and
(b) in the case of an action based on the failure of any person to comply with an order of
the Tribunal or another court, after two years from
(i) the day on which the order of the Tribunal or court was contravened, or
(ii) the day on which any criminal proceedings relating thereto were finally
disposed of, whichever is the later.
The level of private enforcement activity under section 36 since
its enactment has been extremely sparse 2 3 This may be explained in
part by constitutional doubts as to the validity of the section which
23 For a review of this experience, see G. Leslie & S. Bodley, "The Record of Private Actions
Under Section 36 of the Competition Act" (1993) Can. Comp. Record 50.
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persisted until 1989, when the Supreme Court of Canada upheld its
validity in General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing.24
However, even since the constitutional validity of the section was
resolved, there appears to be only one reported case on section 36, and
since 1976 only three reported cases where plaintiffs sought
(unsuccessfully) to prove a violation of the criminal provisions of the Act,
and only two reported actions (both unsuccessful), where plaintiffs
sought to rely on a previous criminal conviction. 25 Thus, in sharp
contrast to the American experience, public enforcement actions with
respect to the criminal provisions of the Competition Act (including the
misleading advertising provisions) vastly outnumber private actions with
respect to alleged violations of the same provisions.
With respect to the reviewable practice provisions in the
Competition Act (now Part VIII), first enacted in the 1976 amendments
and extended in the 1986 amendments through the transfer of the
merger and monopoly provisions from the criminal law to administrative
review by the Competition Tribunal, section 36 has no application since,
by its terms, it is confined to the criminal provisions in Part VI of the
Act. Moreover, the record of public enforcement of these provisions, at
least as reflected in concluded proceedings before the Competition
Tribunal, is itself quite sparse. Between 1976 and 1986, there were only
two reported decisions of the former Restrictive Trade Practices
Commission (superseded in 1986 by the Competition Tribunal)-one an
exclusive dealing case 26 and the other a tying case.27 Since the 1986
amendments, the tribunal has decided two refusal to deal cases,28 three
abuse of dominant position cases, 29 one exclusive dealing case,30 and two
24 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641.
25 See Leslie & Bodley, supra note 23 at 51-52.
26 Director of Investigation and Research v. Bombardier Ltd. (1980), 53 C.P.R. (2d) 47 (Rest.
Trade Pract. Comm.-Combines).
2 7 Director of Investigation and Research v. BBM Bureau of Measurement (1981), 60 C.P.R. (2d)
26 (Rest. Trade Pract. Comm.-Combines).
28 Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Chrysler Canada Ltd. (1989), 27 C.P.R.
(3d) 1 (Comp. Trib.); and Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Xerox Canada Inc.
(1990), 33 C.P.R. (3d) 83 (Comp. Trib.).
29 Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. NutraSweet Co. (1990), 32 C.P.R. (3d) 1
(Comp. Trib.); Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Laidlaw Waste Systems Ltd. (1992),
40 C.P.R.(3d) 289 (Comp. Trib.); and Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Tele-Direct
Inc. (Tribunal File No. CT-94/03, February 1997) [as yet unreported].
30 Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Neilson (1995), (Comp. Trib.)
[unreported].
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contested merger cases3 1 In public enforcement proceedings under Part
VIII of the Act, the primary remedy is injunctive relief (cease and desist
orders), and, only in extreme cases where such orders are likely to prove
ineffective, structural relief. The tribunal cannot impose fines for
conduct or practices found to violate any of the provisions of Part VIII
except for ensuing breaches of orders that it has made with respect to
such conduct or practices.
III. THE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF PUBLIC LAWS
There has been a traditional tendency to assume that laws
designed to produce public benefits should be enforced by public
authorities while laws designed to regulate the interactions of private
actors should be enforced by private actors. This has always been an
oversimplification given the dominant role that private prosecutions
played in the criminal law well into the nineteenth century.32 Even
today, when vast resources are devoted to public prosecution of crimes,
the criminal law can still be enforced by private prosecutions 3 3
Although public prosecutors can take over or stay private prosecutions,
the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that the ability of a private
31 Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Hillsdown Holdings Ltd. (1992), 41 C.P.R.
(3d) 289 (Comp. Trib.); and Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc. (1992),
43 C.P.R. (3d) 161 (Comp. Trib.).
32 This, of course, led to some abuses of the criminal process such as the use of private
prosecutions as a form of blackmail. At the same time, public prosecutors with a monopoly of
prosecutorial powers may be vulnerable to charges of favoritism. B. Boyer & E. Meidinger,
"Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits under Federal
Environmental Laws" (1985) 34 Buff. L. Rev. 833 at 956-57:
In short, experience has shown that both an extensive system of private prosecution and a
public monopoly in criminal enforcement are susceptible to abuse. What is needed is the
appropriate mix of public and private enforcement that will fit the particular times and its
social needs, together with adequate systems of accountability to prevent abuse.
33 The Supreme Court of Canada has stated that "the right of an ordinary citizen, the victim of
a criminal offence, to lay an information against the offender" is a "fundamental precept" of the
criminal justice system, and has overturned attempts to vest exclusive prosecutorial policy over
young offenders to provincial authorities: Quebec (A.G.) v. Lechasseur (Quebec Youth Court Judge),
[1981] 2 S.C.R. 253 at 261. See generally F. Kaufman, "The Role of the Private Prosecutor: A
Critical Analysis of the Complainant's Position in Criminal Cases" (1960) 7 McGill L.J. 102; P.
Burns, "Private Prosecutions in Canada: The Law and a Proposal for Change" (1975) 21 McGill LJ.
269; P. Stenning, Appearing for the Crown: A Legal and Historical Review of Criminal Prosecutorial
Authority in Canada (Cowansville, Que.: Brown Legal Publications, 1986) c. 12; and Law Reform
Commission of Canada, Private Prosecutions, (Working Paper No. 52) (Ottawa: Law Reform
Commission of Canada, 1986).
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individual to present a case to a judicial official can increase the
prosecutor's accountability. 34 Another important form of public law,
constitutional law, depends almost entirely on private enforcement.
Canadian courts have granted public interest standing to those not
directly affected by the impugned laws in order to better protect the
"right of the citizenry to constitutional behaviour by Parliament .... 1,35
Environmental and consumer protection laws are enforced through a
mixture of private and public enforcement. 36 Thus, private enforcement
is an established feature of many areas of public law.
The initial case for private enforcement is quite strong. The
private enforcement of public laws can act as a check on the monopoly
power of enforcement that public authorities would otherwise enjoy. A
private individual who has suffered a violation may be in a better
position and may have better information to enforce public laws than a
public official. It is the aggrieved person rather than the public official
who has the greatest incentive to seek corrective justice in the form of
damages or other remedies.
Nonetheless, the assumption that public laws should be
administered by public officials has persisted. This has particularly been
true in Canada where governments often appear to be the only actors
with the resources and accountability structures necessary to develop
effective prosecution policies. Private actors, in many cases, may lack
the desire, resources, or expertise to enforce public laws. Those that do
possess these qualifications may seek to appropriate the enforcement
powers and remedies ordinarily available only to public officials in order
to advance their own strategic ends.
34 Dowson v. R., [1983] 2 S.C.R. 144 at 155-56. See generally J.LI.J. Edwards, The Attorney
General, Politics and the Public Interest (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984) c. 6.
35 Thorson v. Canada (A.G.) (No. 2), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138 at 162. This case has been expanded
to allow public interest standing when the legality as opposed to the constitutionality of
governmental actions is challenged: Finlay v. Canada (Finance), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 607. Recently, the
courts have restricted public interest standing especially when there is a directly affected person
who could bring a similar challenge. See generally K. Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada
(Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1994) c. 5. In a very recent case, R. v. Edwards, [1996] 1 S.C.R.
128, the Court denied an accused standing to argue that evidence should not be admitted on the
basis that the search and seizure rights of a third party had been violated when it was obtained.
American courts have reached similar conclusions even though it may only be the accused and not
the third party who has the incentive to challenge the constitutionality of the search and seizure.
See D. Meltzer, "Deterring Constitutional Violations By Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and
Defendants as Private Attorneys General" (1988) 88 Colum. L. Rev. 247.
36 See for example Environmental Bill of Rights, S.O. 1993, c. 28, Part VI, as am. by S.O. 1996,
c. 27, s. 22.
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As will be discussed below, the United States has facilitated
private enforcement by encouraging private plaintiffs to act as private
attorneys general in a number of fields. The American embrace of
private enforcement can be related to willingness to see the law in
instrumental terms and a skepticism about devoting resources and
monopoly power to public enforcement. To be sure, much of the
American enthusiasm for private enforcement has waned with the
growing sense that private litigation of all forms is becoming a drag on
much productive activity. It is feared that uncoordinated attempts by
private individuals to deter socially undesirable behaviour will result in
the deterrence of socially useful behaviour.
At the same time, Canadian attitudes towards private
enforcement may be changing in the opposite direction because of a
variety of factors. Canadian faith in governments has been sorely tested
in recent years and private enforcement can increase the accountability
of public officials. It can also serve as a fail-safe mechanism should
public enforcement fall below optimal or acceptable levels. Anglo-
Canadian costs rules such as the "loser pays" principle and restrictions
on damage awards, civil jury trials, class actions, and contingency fees
may prevent some of the excesses of the American experience with
private enforcement. In addition, a growing lack of consensus about
what is in the public interest in Canadian society makes exclusive public
enforcement more problematic and suggests that private individuals and
groups should be allowed an opportunity to advance their claims that
they act in the public interest. Finally, in times of fiscal restraint, the
prospect of attracting private resources to the enterprise of enforcing
public laws is appealing.
A. The Political Theory of Private Enforcement
Theorists of the liberal state starting with Thomas Hobbes have
taken an unfavourable view of private enforcement of public laws. For
Hobbes, the state of nature which existed before the development of the
state relied exclusively on private enforcement of the law. Primarily for
that reason, "the life of man [was] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and
short."37 Individuals acting in their rational self-interest will willingly
trade the ability to enforce law for a public monopoly over violence
which will make their lives richer and longer. A public monopoly over
enforcement is necessary to induce each person to divert his or her
3 7 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by C.B. MacPherson (Middlesex, U.K.: Penguin, 1968) at 186.
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resources from self-protection and self-help to more productive
activities. The re-introduction of private enforcement of public law
troubles those influenced by liberal state of nature theorists, even
though the enforcement of private law has long depended on individual
self-help.
Acceptance of exclusive public enforcement of the law has been
augmented by other developments in political theory. Jean-Jacques
Rousseau added the romantic concept of the general will to Hobbes'
more utilitarian defence of the modern state.3 8 Public enforcement was
not simply more efficient, but also a more genuine expression of public
policy. The modern state soon created its own argument for exclusive
reliance on public enforcement. Max Weber, for example, suggested
that more developed societies would regularize their policies through
the mechanism of bureaucratic rationality.3 9 Full-time professional
prosecutors subject to hierarchical control were better situated to
implement rational prosecutorial policies than private individuals, who
would not be subject to bureaucratic control and might be motivated by
irrational motivations such as the desire for vengeance. Unlike the
part-time private prosecutor, a full-time public prosecutor could develop
specialized expertise.
There are theoretical arguments in favour of private
enforcement of public laws. Some commentators, drawing on retributive
theories, have argued that private enforcement is justified if the litigant
is vindicating pre-existing natural rights, but is not justified if it is based
on legislation that attempts to maximize general welfare. 4 0 Much
modern legislation, however, is concerned with both social welfare and
individual rights. Expanded notions of entitlement and rights to citizen
participation will increase the range of laws that can be subject to private
enforcement. Private enforcement can be seen as a participatory activity
which allows individuals and groupsio compete over increasingly
pluralistic understandings of the public interest. A growing sense of the
deep pluralism of public ends creates skepticism about the ability of
electoral and legislative politics to provide the only forum for mediating
competing interests. Private enforcement, for example in the
environmental field, allows individuals and groups with a sense of
grievance a direct opportunity to make enforcement claims in court.
38 J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, ed. by M. Cranston, (Middlesex, U.K.: Penguin, 1968).
39 M. Weber, Economy and Society:An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, vol. II, ed. by G. Roth
& C. Wittich, trans. E. Fischoff (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968) c. 8, 11.
40 J.R.S. Prichard & A. Brudner, "Tort Liability for Breach of Statute: A Natural Rights
Perspective" (1983) 2 Law & Phil. 89 at 100.
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Increased skepticism about distinctions between public and
private power also can support private enforcement. A private plaintiff
may have as much, if not more, expertise and information than a public
official. Moreover, such an actor may, because of its own self-interest,
have a stronger incentive to enforce a public law than a public agency
concerned with its own interests. Conversely, a private target of public
enforcement may be in a position to obtain favours from public officials
that are not in the public interest because they impose diffuse but
significant costs on the public. Private enforcement can be a check on
the capture of public enforcement officials.
An important but largely negative justification for private
enforcement is governmental failure, particularly capture and public
choice theories of governance.41 If public enforcers cannot be relied
upon to enforce laws vigorously against regulated sectors, then it is
necessary to replace or supplement their efforts with private enforcers.
Greater numbers of private enforcers can less easily be lobbied or co-
opted than a discrete number of public enforcement officials.
B. The Law and Economics of Private Enforcement
The optimal use of private enforcement of public laws has been a
matter of contention in the law and economics literature. Following his
pioneering work stressing the need for high penalties to compensate for
low probabilities of detection,42 Gary Becker with George Stigler argued
that deterrence could be as effectively achieved if private individuals
enforced the law by competing for the high damages that would follow
from demonstrating that a defendant was liable.43 Reflecting the
tendency to justify private enforcement as a response to governmental
failure, Becker and Stigler were concerned with the possibility of
malfeasance or inaction among public regulators. They argued that it
was better to reward private enforcers "by a 'piece-rate' or a 'bounty.'
instead of the fixed salary paid to public enforcers. They concluded:
41 M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965); M.J. Trebilcock et al, The Choice of Governing
Instrument: A Study Prepared for the Economic Council of Canada (Ottawa: Economic Council of
Canada, 1982); and D.A. Farber & P.P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
42 G. Becker, "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach" (1968) 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169.
43 G. Becker & G. Stigler, "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and Compensation of Enforcers"
(1974) 3 J. Legal Stud. 1.
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Society is more likely to use fines equal to damages divided by the probability of
conviction to punish offenders if it must pay this amount to successful enforcers.
Although private enforcement of rules need not change the rules, we predict that they
would gain currency and relevance because enforcement would then be much more
efficient and transparent.44
Becker and Stigler acknowledged some potential problems in
private enforcement. They recommended that both public and private
enforcers who brought unsuccessful actions should be required to
compensate the innocent defendant and that "the concept of double
jeopardy would need elaboration," 45 given anticipated competition
among private enforcers.
A year later, William Landes and Richard Posner challenged the
conclusion that private enforcement could be as efficient as public
enforcement. They argued that if fines or damages higher than the
social costs of the illegal activity were required to deter defendants, this
would attract higher than optimal numbers of individuals seeking to
collect such fines or damages by being private enforcers of the' law and
devoting their own private resources to detection and prosecution. This
would increase the probability of detection beyond the low level posited
by Becker and could result in over-enforcement and deterrence above
socially optimal levels.4 6 Public enforcers not driven by profit
maximization could make better decisions about what resources to
devote to prosecution than the uncoordinated activities of private
individuals competing for high fines or damages. This insight about the
potential for over-deterrence in private enforcement does not justify a
total abandonment of private enforcement. Rather, it suggests a need
for the rewards offered to private enforcers to be carefully controlled to
ensure that private actors do not divert more private resources than are
socially optimal to the enforcement of public standards.
Mitchell Polinsky subsequently challenged the Landes and
Posner thesis of over-deterrence by stressing that rational private
enforcers would only act in cases where the reward available was greater
than the costs of enforcement. The fine or damages recovered by
private enforcers would in many cases be limited by the net worth of the
defendant. In cases with high enforcement costs and/or defendants with
44 Ibid at 14.
45 IbML at 16.
46 W.M. Landes & R.A. Posner, "The Private Enforcement of Law" (1975) 4 J. Legal Stud. 1
at 15. See also W.F. Schwartz, Pivate Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: An Economic Critique
(Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981) at 9 [hereinafter
Economic Critique]; and R.A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 4th ed. (Boston: Little Brown,
1992) at 596 for similar conclusions.
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low net worth, it would not be rational for potential private enforcers of
the law to engage in that activity.47 Like the Posner and Landes analysis,
this insight does not justify the abandonment of private enforcement of
the law. Rather, it points to the complementary roles that private and
public enforcement can play. Private enforcement will be of most value
in those cases in which the rewards available are greater than their
enforcement costs (although excessive rewards may result in
over-enforcement) 48 and public enforcement is most needed in those
cases where the fine or damages that can be extracted from a wrongdoer
is significantly less than the costs of enforcement.
C. The Theory of Private Attorneys General
The utility of private enforcement of public laws has frequently
been discussed in the United States in the context of the role of litigants
as "private attorneys general." The phrase was first used by Judge
Jerome Frank when he recognized the standing of a private litigant in an
administrative law case on the basis that "[s]uch persons, so authorized,
are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals." 49 One of the founders of
Legal Realism, Frank took an overtly instrumental approach to the use
of law and he believed that the initiative of private litigants could
usefully supplement the enforcement efforts of public authorities in
achieving the goals of legislation in the post-New Deal era. Since that
time, there has been support for the private attorney general from many
quarters. It has been noted that:
4 7 A.M. Polinsky, "Private versus Public Enforcement of Fines" (1980) 9 J. Legal Stud. 105 at
107 [hereinafter "Private vs. Public"]: "Under private enforcement, firms are willing to invest in
enforcement only if they at least break even-their fine revenue must be at least as large as their
enforcement costs. Under public enforcement, however, the optimal solution may result in fine
revenue which is less than enforcement costs."
48 Polinsky recognizes that private enforcement may in different circumstances result in both
over- and under-enforcement. See A.M. Polinsky, "Detrebling versus Decoupling Antitrust
Damages: Lessons from the Theory of Enforcement" (1986) 74 Geo. L.J. 1231 at 1234 [hereinafter
"Detrebling"]:
If the same fine is used as under optimal public enforcement, the resulting probability of
detection (generated by the self-interested choices of private enforcers) may be too high
or too low. In other words, if the enforcing is done privately, there may be too much
enforcement or too little enforcement.
4 9 Associated Industries of New York State. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 at 704 (2d. Cir. 1943) vacated
as moot 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
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[I]iberals promote the private attorney general, in part, as an antidote to what they view
as a conservative administration's reluctance to aggressively enforce various regulatory
laws. Conservatives find virtue in the private attorney general concept because of its
function in 'privatizing' law enforcement pursuant to the ideals of economic efficiency. 50
The private attorney general theory is based on the premise that
a positive public good is secured when a private litigant vindicates a
publicly endorsed standard or norm contained in a statute. A corollary
assumption is that the public good is not significantly harmed when a
self-appointed private attorney general is unsuccessful because it is that
person who bears the costs of the unsuccessful litigation. This is
especially true outside the United States, where an unsuccessful plaintiff
would generally be responsible not only for its own legal costs, but for a
significant portion of the costs incurred by its successful adversary. The
private attorney general theory assumes that private litigants, because of
their financial51 or ideological5 2 interests in the matter, will have
adequate incentives to invest in investigation and litigation which,
because it is designed to vindicate public standards, will be in the public
interest.
The use of private attorneys general has flourished in the United
States in a number of contexts. It has been used to justify the creation or
maintenance of private causes of actions to enforce antitrust statutes,53
securities law,54 and environmental legislation.55 The enforcement
activities of private attorneys general are encouraged by one-way costs
rules which allow successful plaintiffs who act as private attorneys
50 B.W. Garth, I.H. Nagel & S.J. Player, "The Institution of the Private Attorney General:
Perspectives from an Empirical Study of Class Actions" (1988) 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 353 at 353.
51 Landes & Posner, supra note 46; "Private vs. Public," supra note 47; and W.F. Schwartz,
"An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Litigation" (1980) 68 Geo. L. J. 1075 [hereinafter
"Overview"].
52 L. Jaffe, "The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological
Plaintiff" (1968) 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1033; A. Chayes, "The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation" (1976) 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281; and O.M. Fiss, "Foreword: The Forms of Justice" (1979)
93 Harv. L. Rev. 1.
53 Private actions were available since 1890, but their frequency increased rapidly in the post-
War era and especially since the 1960s. See R.A. Posner, "A Statistical Study of Antitrust
Enforcement" (1970) 13 J. L. & Econ. 365 at 371; and Salop & White, supra note 11.
54J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 421 U.S. 723 (1964).
55 R.F. Blomquist, "Rethinking the Citizen as Prosecutor Model of Environmental
Enforcement under the Clean WaterAct: Some Overlooked Problems of Outcome-Independent
Values" (1988) 22 Ga. L Rev. 337.
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general to be indemnified for the costs of successful litigation5 6 without
facing the disincentive of paying their adversary's costs should they lose.
In addition, fee arrangements between a litigant and his or her lawyer
can encourage litigation by private attorneys general. For example, the
legal fees of a private attorney general might be collected from a
common fund or paid only if the litigant is successful. Contingency fee
arrangements allow the plaintiff's lawyer to be the de facto private
attorney general. Cost and fees arrangements are particularly important
when private attorneys general are motivated by ideological concerns
about the public interest rather than their own financial concerns.5 7
D. The Strengths of Private Attorneys General
Private attorneys general can supplement public enforcement.
This can occur when a private attorney general seeks a remedy for a
matter that has escaped the attention of public authorities. This may
frequently occur in cases where the costs of investigation are high for
public enforcers, but relatively low for private enforcers. Alternatively,
public enforcers could be aware of the matter but decide that a public
prosecution is not a rational allocation of resources. Even if a public
prosecution is undertaken it may only secure a criminal or quasi-criminal
conviction, or perhaps an order requiring a defendant to comply with
public standards. Private attorneys general can usefully supplement
public enforcement efforts by securing fuller compensation for the
damages caused by non-compliance 58 and by giving the court added
56 "Comment-Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts" (1974) 122
U. Pa. L. Rev. 636. A United States Supreme Court decision that drastically reduced one way fee
shifting, Alyseka Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), was quickly overruled
by Congress in part out of a desire to encourage private attorneys general and to limit "the growth
of the enforcement bureaucracy": The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)), quoted in J.C. Coffee
Jr., "Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not
Working" (1983) 42 Md. L. Rev. 215 at 226.
57 C. Tollefson, "When the 'Public Interest' Loses: The Liability of Public Interest Litigants
for Adverse Costs Awards" (1995) 29 U.B.C. L. Rev. 303.
58 Professor Coffee has commented, supra note 56 at 224-25 that:
[a]bsent these private actions, the monetary penalties for antitrust and securities fraud
plainly would be insufficient to deter. Second, it often may be more efficient for public
agencies to concentrate on detection (an area where they have the comparative
advantage because of their superior investigative resources) and leave the actual
litigation of the case to private enforcers, who are frequently more experienced in
litigation tactics.
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information that may help it to make better orders to achieve
compliance in the future. Adding private resources to public
enforcement efforts is effective so long as the additional resources do
not result in over-deterrence.S9
Private enforcement is superior to public enforcement in
compensating those aggrieved by violations and achieving corrective
justice.60 Compensation is usually thought of as damages, but can
include any order designed to correct the harm that the plaintiff has
suffered from a violation. The virtues of private enforcement as a form
of corrective justice are often discounted in American debates because
of the stress placed on treble damages and other devices to encourage
private enforcement in order to achieve deterrence. Public prosecutions
can include some elements of compensation if orders for restitution are
made.
Private enforcers may in some instances be at a comparative
advantage to their public counterparts. Because they may be directly
affected by the matter, they may have a greater incentive to take some
enforcement action. Closer proximity to the violation may also mean
that the costs of detecting possible violations and gathering evidence
may be less for them than they would be for a public enforcer. For
example, a firm or customer may be able to detect anti-competitive
practices that they experience on a daily basis more easily than a public
official who must regulate large sectors of the economy. Moreover, the
firm or customer would be more knowledgeable about industry practices
than a public enforcer.61 Contrary to the Weberian assumption that the
59 James Musgrove assumes that private actions will result in over-deterrence when he argues:
Direct expenditures on enforcement or adjudication should be largely irrelevant to the
debate as to the proper type and level of antitrust enforcement. Getting enforcement
'right' in this area will add to government revenues, almost regardless of direct cost.
Getting enforcement 'wrong', however, can be expected to shrink government revenues,
even if immediate direct expenses are reduced. Allowing private actions to save money,
at least without some considerable study, is a penny wise, pound foolish strategy.
J.B. Musgrove, "Remedies for Reviewable Conduct: Adjusting the Balance" (1995) Can.
Comp. Record 34 at 44 [hereinafter "Remedies"].
60 J.R.S. Prichard & MJ. Trebilcock, "Class Actions and Private Law Enforcement" (1977) 26
U.N.B. L.J. 5 at 11.
61 S. Shavell, "Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety" (1984) 13 J. Legal Stud. 357 at
360: "private parties should generally enjoy an inherent advantage in knowledge" over regulators
because of their knowledge of the benefits and risks of their own activities. "For a regulator to
obtain comparable information would often require virtually continuous observation of parties'
behaviour, and thus would be a practical impossibility." In the antitrust context, it has been
observed that: "Competitors and takeover targets are ideal litigants in terms of litigation capability
because they are likely to have the skill, knowledge of the industry, financial resources, legal
sophistication and motivation to make a powerful case with ... speed and precision": J.F. Brodley,
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public bureaucrat has greater expertise, private attorneys general may
have the expertise best suited to the particular prosecution.
Adding private resources to enforcement efforts will likely
increase rates of litigation and this will add to the jurisprudence defining
and fleshing out the often vague and general standards contained in the
public law being enforced. George Priest and Benjamin Klein have
argued that individual cases can serve a public good by acting as
precedents which allow others to conduct their affairs with more
certainty about the relevant legal standards. 62 Private litigation in the
United States has been responsible for many of the leading antitrust
precedents especially since public enforcement efforts tapered off in the
early 1980s. 63 In determining the value of the jurisprudence produced
by private enforcement, however, policy makers should be sensitive to
whether rule-making and other forms of administrative regulation may
be a more efficient and comprehensive means to elaborate the general
standards contained in public laws.64 Nonetheless, a concrete case
decided in the context of the adversary system may produce a more
tangible precedent than administrative guidelines which will often be
quite flexible and preserve enforcement discretion.
The private attorney general theory is not only based on a
positive vision of private initiative and comparative advantage but a
recognition of possible failures in public enforcement. In somewhat
crude terms, it may be better to have numerous private enforcers of
public law than a handful of public attorneys general tied to elected
"Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling Private Incentives and Public
Enforcement Goals" (1995) 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1 at 35.
62 G.L. Priest & B. Klein, "The Selection of Disputes for Litigation" (1984) 13 J. Legal Stud.
1; and G.L. Priest, "Channelling Civil Litigation: A Comment on Civil Justice Reform in Ontario"
in Ontario Law Reform Commission, Study Paper on Prospects for Civil Justice by R.A. MacDonald
(Toronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1995) 239.
63 During the Reagan-Bush years much of government enforcement was limited to criminal
bid-rigging prosecutions. ... [Ilt was in the context of private litigation that the Supreme
Court enunciated most of its important antitrust decisions. These private cases involved
price fixing, monopolization, predatory pricing, price discrimination, dealer terminations,
tying, and boycotts. Had there been no private cause of action under the antitrust laws,
much of the development in antitrust doctrine during that period might never had
occurred:
H. First, "Antitrust Enforcement in Japan" (1995) 64 Antitrust L. J. 137 at 179-80 [footnotes
omitted].
64 "Remedies," supra note 59 at 44-45: "greater access to the Tribunal will lead to greater
jurisprudence" but Musgrove cautions that a better alternative is for the Bureau to issue more
enforcement guidelines for reviewable conduct. This alternative "has the attractions of lower cost
and more certainty of outcome.... [D]ealing with the Bureau in respect of such conduct is likely to
be a more certain and predictable exercise than going before the Tribunal. It is also much less
expensive than litigation": ibid. at 44-45.
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governments. Public enforcers may be more interested in maximizing
their own budgets or political support than in enforcing the law.65 In the
product liability context, commentators have observed that countries
lacking private attorneys general attracted by large damages awards
"tend to compensate for the attorneys' absence by instituting a
functional equivalent: a huge government bureaucracy charged with
evaluating products."66 Similarly, in the environmental context, the
growth of private enforcement has somewhat offset declining resources
devoted to public enforcement.67 Private enforcement may be a crucial
means to fill regulatory gaps created as governments downsize in
response to fiscal constraints.
Even if government remains active in a regulatory field, it may
not be as effective as private enforcers. Public enforcers may face
perverse incentives and be more susceptible to capture by organized
groups. As John Coffee argues:
[P]rivate enforcement also performs an important failsafe ... function by ... ensuring that
legal norms are not wholly dependent on the current attitudes of public enforcers or the
vagaries of the budgetary process and that the legal system emits clear and consistent
signals to those who might be tempted to offend. Absent private enforcement, potential
defendants would have a considerably stronger incentive to lobby against public
enforcement efforts or to seek to curtail funds to public enforcement agencies.
Ultimately, private enforcement helps ensure the stability of legal norms by preventing
abrupt transitions in enforcement policy that have not been sanctioned by the
legislature.68
In short, private enforcement can compensate for weaknesses and
fluctuations in public enforcement.
Private enforcement also serves as an important means of
ensuring that public enforcers are accountable for decisions not to
65 M.A. Cohen & P.H. Rubin, "Private Enforcement of Public Policy" (1985) 3 Yale J. Reg.
167 at 170.
66 M. Rustad & T. Koenig, "The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards:
Reforming the Tort Reformers" (1993) 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1269 at 1325.
67 Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 32; and Blomquist, supra note 55.
68 Coffee, supra note 56 at 227. Jerzy Mashaw articulates a similar idea when he states:
A final hypothesis is that the legislature believes that some competition, or the threat of
competition, from private enforcers may stimulate public enforcement efforts. Our
general distrust of monopoly is based on the theory that monopoly produces stodginess
and underproduction and that it provides incentives to appropriate benefits for the
producer which under competitive conditions would go to consumers. Public officials
and bureaucracies which have a monopoly position are, after all, no less subject to these
unwanted behavioral characteristics than the general run of mankind.
J.L. Mashaw, "Private Enforcement of Public Regulatory Provisions: The 'Citizen Suit' (1975)
4 Class Action Rep. 29 at 33.
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prosecute. There are numerous means to increase accountability such as
reporting requirements and legislative oversight, but there are grounds
to believe that private enforcement may be a particularly effective and
efficient means to ensure accountability. It allows the judgment of the
public official to be challenged in a way that does not impose costs on
the public agency and can lead to a concrete determination of whether
the government was correct in concluding that no violation had
occurred. It allows critics of prosecutorial decisions not to prosecute to
put their money where their mouth is and assume for themselves the
role of public prosecutor.
An alternative to private enforcement is to allow the public to
seek some form of administrative or judicial review of an agency's
decision not to prosecute. For example, six members of the public may
petition the Director of the Canadian Competition Policy Bureau to
commence an inquiry.6 9 Richard Stewart and Cass Sunstein have
termed such mechanisms rights of initiation. Although they are critical
of judicial creation of private rights of action, 70 Stewart and Sunstein see
them as superior to private rights of initiation as an accountability
mechanism because:
A weak initiation right-which is all the courts will usually afford-places a substantial
burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the agency's inaction was unreasonable.
Moreover, 'victory' may consist merely of a remand for a better explanation of the
agency's decision not to act. There are also institutional advantages. A private right of
action does not require courts to monitor the use of public enforcement resources, nor
does it require the agency to divert those limited resources to the defence of initiation
suits. Moreover, private rights of action impose a budget discipline on plaintiffs more
stringent than in initiation cases. Private rights of action permit private parties to enforce
a statute beyond the level permitted by an agency's limited budget only if they believe
that the benefits cf additional enforcement outweigh its costs. This method of making
enforcement decisions may be desirable, since private litigants-who are often closer to
local controversies than are public officials-may know more about the costs and benefits
of particular enforcement initiatives. Finally, since private right of action cases tend to be
more narrowly focused than initiation suits, the right of action may better reflect differing
preferences for collective goods. 71
69 Competition Act, supra note 2, s. 9.
70 They oppose judicially created private rights of action on the basis that such rights "could
disrupt legislative judgements concerning appropriate enforcement levels, undermine legislative
decisions to entrust regulatory decisions to centralized, specialized and politically accountable
bodies, and impose undue burdens on the courts": R.B. Stewart & C.R. Sunstein, "Public Programs
and Private Rights" (1982) 95 Harv. L Rev. 1195 at 1290.
71 Ibid. at 1289-90.
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Private rights of action can be an efficient and manageable form of
promoting accountability among public enforcers particularly for low
visibility decisions not to commence enforcement actions.
In summary, the case for private attorneys general is based
positively on the advantages of giving a multiplicity of individuals and
groups an opportunity to enforce and elaborate public standards and
obtain corrective justice and negatively on the dangers of exclusive
reliance on public enforcement.
E. The Weaknesses of Private Attorneys General
Public enforcement retains many comparative advantages over
private enforcement that should make any policymaker cautious about
abolishing public enforcement or using the availability of private
enforcement as an excuse for taking significant resources away from
public enforcement. Although generally sympathetic to private
enforcement as a supplement to public enforcement, Robert Prichard,
for example, acknowledges: "[n]umerous factors favour public
enforcement: the economies of scale in some types of investigation, the
superior investigative tools, the absence of problems of appropriability,
and the simplicity and flexibility of the fine all represent efficiency
advantages of public enforcement." 72
The comparative advantages that public enforcers enjoy over
private enforcers, especially if balanced with an understanding of the
weaknesses of public enforcement, only speak to the need for the correct
balance between public and private enforcement. Determining the right
mixture of public and private enforcement will be a complex, ongoing
process, but one that can be achieved by altering the resources available
to public enforcers and the incentives available to private enforcers.
Nonetheless, there are some arguments for why enforcement should
remain a monopoly of public officials. These arguments focus on the
harm that private enforcement efforts may cause to public enforcement
policy and the costs that may be imposed on those subject to strategically
motivated and unmeritorious private enforcement efforts. These
arguments against allowing any private enforcement will now be
examined.
72 J.R.S. Prichard, "Private Enforcement and Class Actions" in J.R.S. Prichard, W.T. Stanbury
& T.A. Wilson, eds., Canadian Competition Policy: Essays in Law and Economics (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1979) 217 at 237.
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One concern with private enforcement is the danger of
over-deterrence stressed by Posner and others.73 Private enforcement is
less coordinated than public enforcement. Even if they can shape the
incentives for private enforcement, policymakers cannot confidently
predict the level of private enforcement. Posner's warnings are
particularly important in a context where the rewards of private
enforcement substantially outweigh the costs of enforcement and where
multiple plaintiffs can assume the role of a private attorney general in
any single case. The risk of over-deterrence is less if the rewards are
more modest and can be adjusted should the supply of private
enforcement prove excessive.
Another weakness of private enforcement is that whenever
private initiative and resources are used for public ends, there is a
danger of strategic behaviour. Such behaviour will mean that the private
objectives of the plaintiff will supplant the public purposes of the statute
sought to be enforced. As Joseph Brodley has argued, this danger is
particularly high in the antitrust field because the most likely plaintiffs
are frequently competitors or takeover targets of defendants.7 4 These
plaintiffs have the greatest incentive to take enforcement actions and
they may also have the best information about the case. Nonetheless,
they are also likely to employ private enforcement measures for strategic
ends even if they do not have a pro-competitive case. Brodley argues
that the dangers of strategic, non public-regarding behaviour do not
justify an abandonment of private enforcement,7 5 but require careful
management of the procedures available to litigants. It needs to be
added that strategic behaviour can also affect public enforcement
regimes where private parties with private contractual or
semi-contractual grievances (e.g., distributors against suppliers) will
pressure public enforcement agencies to take up these grievances at
public expense, even though no broader public interest is implicated.
Nonetheless, the risk of strategic behaviour is an important weakness of
private enforcement.
Another weakness of private enforcement may be the disruption
of public enforcement policies. Private enforcement serves as a check
73 Landes & Posner, supra note 46.
74 See generally Brodley, supra note 61. In the Canadian context see P.K. Gorecki, The
Administration and Enforcement of Competition Policy in Canada, 1960 to 1975: An Application of
Performance Measurement (Ottawa: Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, 1979) at 240.
75 Brodley, supra note 61 at 45: "[I]itigants in antitrust cases, like other economic actors, seek
to benefit themselves, not to promote social welfare .... No litigant's personal agenda will
correspond fully with the social agenda."
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on prosecutorial discretion and in particular, the decision not to
prosecute. If the public prosecutor is an expert with a mandate to
regulate a particular field of endeavour, then his or her decision not to
prosecute may be based on a reasoned decision that it is in the public
interest not to prosecute.76 The use of private attorneys general to
enforce public laws can be criticized as a privatization of law
enforcement which should be the exclusive preserve of democratically
accountable officials. Robert Blomquist, for example, has argued:
[t]he only intrinsic constraint on a private suitor seeking to use penal laws for private ends
is whether the costs of litigation outweigh its potential benefit to him. In contrast,
government prosecutors, when deciding to enforce a penal law are presumed to be
substantially motivated by public interest considerations. Public prosecutors, therefore,
are expected to select and pursue cases on the basis of informed, dispassionate judgment
about the harmful social significance of the conduct being challenged. 77
Jerry Mashaw also notes that private enforcement can undermine
prosecutorial discretion but believes that the only "cause for real
concern" is that it might result in inconsistent treatment of similarly
situated offenders. "That private parties should want to add resources
to those currently available, take on hard cases, or swim against local
political currents when seeking to enforce nationally established or
approved rules of conduct is no cause for alarm."78 As will be examined
in Part V, below, there are means to reconcile private enforcement with
76 Of course, the decision not to prosecute could also be motivated by many other factors
including ignorance of the possible violation, lack of resources or non-public-regarding motives such
as corruption. As Prichard notes in Pritchard, Stanbury & Wilson, eds., supra note 72, 217 at 239,
the factors that are considered when exercising prosecutorial discretion "are open to abuse but they
are equally open to considerations that are in the public interest." He notes that in the competition
law context, exclusive public enforcement:
allows the agency to make continuous marginal adjustments in policy without engaging
the costs of obtaining legislative change and having the policy altered. The variations in
enforcement strategy can therefore allow efficient and desirable flexibility in the
development of public policy.... Many competition offences are defined in general terms
partly because much of business behaviour involves concurrently both anti-competitive
and efficiency producing aspects. The trade-off of the two is not a simple judgment and
may, in some cases, be as much a question of economic policy as one of law enforcement.
7 7 Blomquist, supra note 55 at 371. He stresses "the detrimental impact that citizen suits can
have on the informal administrative process of give and take, where sound regulatory standards
require time, judgment, and efficient adjustment based on a number of bargained-for practical
considerations": ibid. at 404. Blomquist does not categorically reject private enforcement but
suggests it should be limited to those directly affected by the impugned activity and their remedies
should generally be limited to those required to make them whole as opposed to those necessary to
punish and deter. His criticisms are directed at private attorneys general in the environmental
context who have wide standing rights and can request criminal penalties rather than private
attorneys general in the antitrust context who have more restricted powers: ibid. at 389-90.
78 Mashaw, supra note 68 at 34.
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the positive values served by public enforcement policies based on
prosecutorial discretion. These include allowing the public prosecutor
to intervene and make known its views about the merits of a particular
private enforcement activity and even to take over or stay the private
action.
There are other, more instrumental, critiques of the private
attorney general theory. Although supportive of private enforcement in
general, Coffee has been critical of how it is practised in the United
States in both the antitrust and securities contexts. Drawing upon
empirical data which suggest that private attorneys general often seek
damages in the wake of a successful public prosecution,7 9 he has
colourfully concluded that present incentive structures "result in a
system-wide misallocation of effort under which the private attorney
general restricts his role to that of a vulture feeding on the carrion left by
public enforcers and seldom stalks his own prey."8 0
This unflattering picture is aggravated by the fact that numerous
private litigants may seek to claim damages after a successful public
prosecution. The incentive of private attorneys general to follow and
free ride on public investigations and enforcement efforts can diminish
their promise as a supplement to public resources.
Other commentators have expressed concerns not so much that
private attorneys general will follow public enforcement measures but
rather that they will pursue objectives that are not in harmony with
public enforcement policy. Barry Boyer and Errol Meidinger, for
example, have commented:
With both public and private enforcers active in a regulatory field, there is a very real
possibility that they will be working at cross purposes. If regulated parties who are
similarly situated receive different treatment depending on whether public and private
enforcers win the race to the courthouse, then the fairness of the regulatory program is
open to question. 81
79 B.S. DuVal Jr., "The Class Action as an Antitrust Enforcement Decree: The Chicago
Experience (II)" [1976] A. B. Found. Res. J. 1273; and M.P. Dooley, "Enforcement of Insider
Trading Restrictions" (1980) 66 Va. L. Rev. 1. More recent data discussed in Kapuer & Snyder,
supra note 12, suggest, however, that the percentage of follow-on cases has declined significantly in
American antitrust law.
80 Coffee, supra note 56 at 238. One study of class actions classified lawyers as social
advocates or legal mercenaries and suggested that the latter "typically do little research prior to
initiating a lawsuit, spend little time mobilizing the class to pursue its interests and seek relatively
narrow remedies through litigation": Garth, Nagel & Plager, supra note 50 at 389. Social advocates,
in contrast, spend more time developing a case, but their efforts are frequently underwritten by
governmental subsidization.
81 Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 32 at 839.
1996]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
This concern, like Coffee's concern about the misallocation of
enforcement resources, can be addressed by giving public officials prior
notice or the authority to veto or take over cases commenced by private
attorneys general.
Private attorneys general, like public officials, may also face
perverse incentives. Coffee notes that a private litigant, especially when
the lawyer is the de facto private attorney general, can easily be bought
off by a nominal settlement which includes generous attorney fees.
Similarly, a competitor who brings an action against another firm might
have an incentive to enter into a collusive settlement with its adversary
that will have anti-competitive effects. Perverse incentives created by
the private attorney general system do not necessarily suggest that the
system is intrinsically flawed, but underline the need for careful design
and monitoring of the enforcement system. In particular, less lucrative
financial awards might diminish some of these perverse incentives while
also eliminating some of the desirable incentives that would motivate
private attorneys general to devote their own resources to investigation
and enforcement of public standards. Various procedures can also be
designed to minimize the risk that strategic behaviour by private
attorneys general will impose unwarranted costs on defendants and the
public at large.
F. Summary
This section has surveyed the strengths and weaknesses of
private enforcement of public laws in general. Private enforcement can
supplement public resources with private initiative and information.
This is particularly compelling if the public resources devoted to
enforcement are modest or diminishing and there is a need for
jurisprudence to flesh out the general standards contained in the public
law. A private enforcer may be in a better position to detect and
prosecute some violations than a public enforcer with a more general
mandate and less specialized expertise. Private enforcement can also be
an effective and efficient means of holding public enforcers accountable
for decisions not to prosecute. Finally, private as opposed to public
enforcement can allow plaintiffs to achieve corrective justice and seek
remedies for both past and future harms.
Public enforcers may enjoy comparative advantages over private
enforcers in terms of economies of scale and investigative tools.
Nonetheless, these advantages suggest the need for an appropriate
mixture of public and private enforcement. There are, however, some
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arguments as to why allowing any private enforcement might be harmful.
One argument is that private enforcement could result in
over-deterrence if numerous private enforcers are attracted to high
rewards. All private enforcement presents a risk that it will be employed
for strategic and private reasons that may conflict with the public goals
of the legislation sought to be enforced. Finally, private enforcement
can disrupt decisions not to prosecute that may be based on a coherent
and defensible enforcement policy of public officials. Most of the
weaknesses of private enforcement can be addressed by procedural
features such as sanctions for strategic behaviour and allowing public
officials to intervene or even terminate private enforcement which
disrupts prosecutorial policies. Various procedural remedies for the
weaknesses of private enforcement will be discussed in Part V, below.
The next part will examine the strengths and weaknesses of private
enforcement specifically in the competition law context.
IV. THEORETICAL DEBATES OVER PRIVATE
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
A. Penalties forAntitrust Violations
Beginning in the 1970s, a long-standing political and scholarly
consensus that had previously supported the mixed enforcement regime
in the United States has given way to vigorous scholarly and political
debate about the appropriateness of the American enforcement regime
(as opposed to the substantive provisions of United States antitrust law,
which have engendered their own set of debates). Since most of the
scholarly literature on private antitrust enforcement focuses on the
American experience, we will begin by reviewing these debates and then
attempt to derive some implications from them for policy options with
respect to the enforcement of the Canadian Competition Act, in
particular the reviewable practices addressed in Part VIII of the Act.
In the first systematic treatment of the policy implications of
alternative antitrust penalties, Kenneth Elzinga and William Breit in
their 1976 book82 posed the question of the optimal enforcement of
antitrust laws. In theory, they argued that the marginal social benefits of
enforcement decline as more cases are brought with respect to less
serious or more debatable practices, while the marginal social costs of
8 2 Antitrust Penalties, supra note 4.
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enforcement rise with increasing levels of enforcement. Thus, in an
ideal world public and private resources would be invested in
enforcement activity up to the point where the marginal cost of
enforcement is equated with the marginal benefits of enforcement-not
less and not more. Stated differently, the policy objective should be to
minimize the costs resulting from harmful conduct and the costs
incurred in reducing it.83 This implies less than perfect or complete
enforcement of antitrust laws. The authors acknowledge (as do Neil
Finkelstein and Jack Quinn in a Canadian context)8 4 that it is impossible
to determine whether existing levels of enforcement are at, below, or
above this level. In the nature of things, this would require detailed
information on the underlying incidence of antitrust violations, and not
merely those that have attracted formal enforcement activity. This
information is unknown, and almost by definition unknowable.
Elzinga and Breit argued in their book that the four principal
sanctions available for antitrust violations i.e., fines; incarceration; treble
damages; and structural remedies, all present their own problems, but
appropriately structured fines are a more effective deterrent than any
other type of sanction. With respect to incarceration, they point to the
traditional reluctance of American courts to jail antitrust violators, in
part because in large corporations it is often difficult to identify with
confidence individuals in senior management who were ultimately
responsible for initiating the offending practice. Incarceration is also a
socially costly sanction. In the case of structural remedies, such as
divestiture, which have also been infrequently used, there are problems
in fashioning remedies that do not forfeit economies of scale and scope;
administrative problems in unscrambling assets once combined; and
problems of determining to whom divestiture should occur in order to
promote a more pro-competitive outcome. With respect to treble
damages, they argue that such damages engender three sets of social
costs: first, perverse incentive effects, where plaintiffs have an incentive
not to adopt precautions to avoid or minimize the impact of antitrust
violations on them, given the windfall that treble damages often
represent; second, misinformation effects where plaintiffs have a strong
incentive to misrepresent pro-competitive or competitively neutral
behaviour as anti-competitive in order to realize the gains from a treble
83 Economic Critique, supra note 46 at 5.
84 N. Finkelstein & J. Quinn, "Reevaluating the Role of Private Enforcement and Private
Party Access to the Competition Tribunal" (Paper presented at the University of Toronto Faculty of
Law, 8 December 1995) [unpublished].
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damages award; and third, reparation (transaction) costs that are
entailed both in determining liability and fixing quantum.
The authors argue that while, historically, fines for antitrust
violations in the United States have been trivial, and thus have entailed
suboptimal deterrence, a properly structured fine regime is the most
efficient form of deterrence. They argue that antitrust violations should
be penalized by a mandatory fine of 25 per cent of a firm's pre-tax
profits for every year of anti-competitive activity. Given this mandatory
fine, public enforcement authorities can then increase or decrease the
amount of monopolistic activity by altering the amount of resources
invested in detecting and convicting violators. Indeed, since publication
of the authors' study, fines for many antitrust violations in both the
United States (reflected in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines) and Canada
have increased dramatically. They argue that public agencies have an
advantage in investigating antitrust violations in that they have at their
disposal investigatory powers that would entail significant potential for
abuse if extended to private actors and that casual evidence suggests that
most important developments in antitrust law has occurred in
government suits. Private parties under their regime would still have an
incentive to inform public agencies of alleged violations, given that the
cost of providing such information is so low. With respect to the
argument that equity demands that victims of antitrust violations be
compensated, they point out that determining the identity of those
damaged by anti-competitive behaviour and the extent of the damages is
analogous to the problem in public finance theory of determining the
incidence and burden of a tax. In both contexts, monopoly overcharges,
depending on elasticities of demand and supply in input and output
markets, will be shifted in varying degrees backwards to suppliers,
employees, and shareholders or forward to direct and indirect
purchasers, as well as inducing inefficient substitution effects
(deadweight losses) that will be next to impossible to measure with any
degree of accuracy and at reasonable cost in any compensation-based
regime. In a later paper,S5 they refer to a comment by Posner to similar
effect:
Everybody's economic welfare is bound up with everybody else's. Why stop with the
ultimate consumer? If he is forced to pay a high price for a product, demand for other
products will fall, and this may hurt the suppliers of those products, and the suppliers'
suppliers and so on ad infinitum. 86
85 W. Breit & K.G. Elzinga, "Private Antitrust Enforcement: The New Learning" (1985) 28
J.L. & Econ. 405 [hereinafter "Private Enforcement"I.
86 Ibid at 415.
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They emphasize in this later paper that deterrence and
compensatory rationales for private rights of action imply quite different
research and policy agendas. This is a crucially important issue
throughout the debates over private antitrust enforcement and warrants
further comment.
B. Deterrence and Private Enforcement
With respect to the deterrence rationale for private enforcement,
as with public enforcement, the optimal sanction is a product of the
probability of successful action and the sanction in that event, yielding
an appropriate expected cost of violation. However, with private
enforcement (unlike public enforcement), these two variables cannot
easily be set independently. If a high sanction is predicated on a low
probability of enforcement, this sanction will encourage excessive
enforcement activity by private parties motivated by the incentive to
capture the high sanction.8 7 With public enforcement, resources can be
fixed at a constant level. Moreover, with a mixed and uncoordinated
system of public and private enforcement, it is impossible to set the
sanction and probability of enforcement in a systematic way.88
These problems have led some commentators to propose
decoupling the amount that the defendant pays and the amount that the
plaintiff receives, in order to avoid incentives to invest in socially
excessive levels of enforcement. 89 However, disagreement persists as to
whether, under a decoupling approach plaintiffs should always receive
less than defendants pay, or whether there may be some forms of
antitrust violations entailing large-scale harm that require substantial
investments in investigative and enforcement resources where private
enforcement is unlikely to occur unless the plaintiff receives more than
the defendant pays.90 Where decoupling involves defendants paying
more than plaintiffs receive, there are legitimate concerns over collusive
and socially suboptimal settlements that may compromise deterrence
objectives. Other proposals entail the detrebling of damages for readily
observable violations (e.g., mergers, tying, exclusive dealing, refusals to
87 See Landes and Posner, supra note 46; Economic Critique, supra note 46.
88 See Economic Critique, supra note 46 at 27; "Overview," supra note 51; and "Private
Enforcement,;' supra note 85.
89 See Economic Critique, supra note 46 at 27.
90 See "Detrebling," supra note 48.
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deal), or for most suits by rivals, where the probability of detection is
high, and retaining treble damages only for non-readily observable
violations (e.g., price fixing). 91
On a deterrence rationale for private antitrust enforcement, even
if the problem of the multiplier could be resolved so as to induce a
socially optimal level of investment in antitrust enforcement activity,
there is still the question of how to determine the damages to which the
multiplier is to be applied.
Two basic choices are available: first, to set the basic damage
equal to the gains to the party who has engaged in anti-competitive
violations; or second, to set the basic penalty equal to the harm caused
by that activity. With respect to the first option, it is important to
distinguish two classes of cases: those where downstream parties have
suffered a monopolistic overcharge; and those where competitors are
complaining of exclusionary practices. In the first class of case, to
remove all gains from the violator from engaging in monopolistic
practices may discourage the pursuit of practices that result in greater
gains to it and others than harm to society (e.g., a merger which yields
some price increases but also enables the realization of even greater cost
efficiencies).
To allow recovery of the full monopoly overcharge may also
ignore the costs incurred by the monopolist in obtaining monopoly
power. These difficulties suggest that it might be preferable to define
the basic damages so as to reflect harm to society rather than gains to
the monopolist. 92 In this case, the optimal damages measure is arguably
the sum of the deadweight loss triangle (reflecting inefficient
substitution effects) and the profit rectangle (relative to the competitive
price), which will force a potential monopolist to compare any cost
savings from the activity with the deadweight loss triangle.9 3 In this
respect, compensating parties only for the monopoly overcharge will
under-deter because it will ignore welfare losses sustained by parties who
have inefficiently substituted away from the monopolized good. Where
the anti-competitive practice complained of involves competitors
complaining of exclusionary practices by rivals, damages sustained by
plaintiffs (e.g., diminished going concern value of firm, discounted
foregone profits) may poorly reflect harm to society, although one could
91 See generally "Private Enforcement," supra note 85 at 436-42; F. Easterbrook, "Detrebling
Antitrust Damages" (1985) 28 J.L & Econ. 445; and H. Hovenkamp, "Treble Damages Reform"
(1988) 33 Antitrust Bull. 233 [hereinafter "Treble Damages Reform"].
92 See "Overview," supra note 51.
93 See "Private Enforcement," supra note 85 at 410-12.
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in principle set the optimal damage measure in the same fashion as in
suits by downstream parties. However, to the extent that private
antitrust proceedings are designed to pre-empt successful exclusionary
behaviour (e.g., predation), these effects will be difficult to estimate, and
in any event may not fully capture all the social costs (including costs to
competitors) that exclusionary conduct engenders. 94 In short, damages
suffered by plaintiffs in both classes of cases will be a poor means of
reflecting either benefits realized or harms caused to society from
violations.
In these debates over the optimal structure of a deterrence
oriented private enforcement regime, it is important to stress that, if
substantive rules could discriminate perfectly between efficient and
inefficient behaviour, and courts and tribunals could apply these rules
perfectly (i.e., error costs are zero), there would be little need to worry
about the structure of penalties. As Frank Easterbrook remarks: "Those
whose conduct is beneficial would be left alone. Others could be
hanged."9 5 Error costs engendered either in the framing of
over-inclusive or ill-defined substantive rules or in their adjudication
tend to strengthen the case for public enforcement over private
enforcement, in that prosecutorial discretion, if properly exercised, can
temper these costs, while private parties have no incentive to take
account of the social consequences of error costs. However, this in turn
implicates another dimension of the debate over public or private
enforcement which is inherently intractable. That is, while it is possible
to deduce some of the incentive properties of various private
enforcement regimes for private parties and at least the nature if not the
magnitude of the social costs and benefits that are likely to be associated
with these incentive properties, public enforcement implicates the
incentives operating on bureaucrats, politicians, and judges or
adjudicators. However indeterminate the analysis of the efficiency
properties of private enforcement regimes, we have an even less firm
grasp of the incentive properties of key public sector decision makers in
this area. For example, will politicians be properly motivated to enact
only welfare enhancing competition laws and allocate appropriate
budgets for their enforcement to the relevant public agencies? Will
officials and employees in these agencies have appropriate incentives to
investigate and enforce these laws, subject to budget constraints, in ways
that are designed to maximize social welfare? Will judges and
94 See "Treble Damages Reform," supra note 91.
95 See Easterbrook, supra note 91; and M.K. Block & J.G. Sidak, "The Cost of Antitrust
Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price-Fixer Now and Then?" (1980) 68 Geo. L.J. 1131.
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adjudicators charged with interpreting these laws possess the necessary
incentives, information, and expertise to interpret and enforce them in
ways that maximize social welfare?
James Musgrove argues that those who wish to make changes to
the present enforcement regime bear the burden of proof as to why
changes are necessary or desirable.96 In our view, this misconceives the
nature of the policy-making process. On almost any important public
policy issue, we never know enough to be absolutely certain whether a
change in policy is likely to enhance social welfare until we try it and
observe the consequences. That is to say, policy making in the real world
has a substantial trial and error component to it. If the burden of proof
were as demanding as Musgrove argues, which would entail knowing at
any given time whether the legal system is precisely at the intersection
between the marginal social benefit and marginal social cost functions in
antitrust enforcement (an unknowable datum), we would never have
been able to justify enacting competition laws in the first place or in
amending them extensively over the past two decades with a view to
rendering them more effective, or in adopting the private damage
remedy in section 36. In all of these cases, none of the critical
information that, in an ideal world, one would want to have was available
at the time that these policy changes were made.
C. Compensation and Private Enforcement
The compensation rationale for private enforcement of antitrust
laws has received relatively short shrift in recent scholarly debates on
antitrust enforcement. We have already noted the indeterminacy
argument by Breit, Elzinga, and Posner, that trying to determine who
ultimately bears a monopoly overcharge is analogous to the intractable
problem in Public Finance theory of determining the ultimate incidence
of a tax. We do not find this argument completely persuasive. In many
tort and breach of contract actions, the ultimate incidence of an
otherwise uncompensated loss is equally difficult to determine, yet this
has not been regarded as a persuasive objection to the award of a
compensation for tortious and contractual wrongdoing, although
damage rules often incorporate doctrines such as remoteness,
mitigation, and contributory negligence in order to render them more
tractable and equitable in their application. In contrast to the pragmatic
objections of Breit, Elzinga, and Posner to awarding compensation for
96 See "Remedies," supra note 59.
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antitrust violations, Warren Schwartz mounts a more principled
objection:
I will say that I know of no widely espoused ground for redistributing wealth that is
effectively served by providing compensation to persons injured by antitrust violations.
One must begin with the realization that disparities in outcome among individuals will
inevitably occur. People are born more or less wealthy, with more or less intelligence,
and prove to be more or less lucky. Which of the many causes of the disparity in outcome
justify compensation? When is the outcome so unfortunate, whatever its cause, that
compensation should be paid?
From neither of these perspectives do antitrust violations seem to provide a good case for
compensation. The losses from antitrust violations are widely dispersed, do not represent
the disappointment of strongly held expectations, and can in many cases be adapted to
without severe dislocation in the lives of the persons affected. Moreover, existing welfare
laws, unemployment compensation, bankruptcy laws, and a number of provisions in the
tax laws provide relief from any catastrophic losses, including those that might result from
an antitrust violation.
Of course, the issue is not whether compensation would be justified if it could be
provided without cost. If compensation is incorporated as a goal of a private system of
antitrust enforcement, the efficacy of the system is greatly impaired. There are,
moreover, substantial costs, which will impede the process of providing compensation
even if the goal is accepted in principle. The payment of compensation in antitrust
proceedings seems both an ineffective way to achieve justice and an unjustifiable
impairment of the effort to enforce the law.97
Again, we do not find these arguments compelling. The case for
compensation in other private law contexts does not rest on any notion
of distributive justice of the kind that Schwartz outlines, but a notion of
corrective justice,98 whereby, irrespective of the wealth of the respective
parties, where one party engages in a form of wrongdoing which violates
the equal autonomy of another party, a legal obligation is recognized to
correct for the consequences of that wrongdoing. This theory of
corrective justice best explains why in various areas of private law (such
as tort and contract law) we recognize the right of innocent parties to
secure compensation from those who have wronged them, not primarily
for instrumental reasons, such as deterrence, even though this may often
be a socially beneficial by-product of such claims by increasing the
probability of liability and hence, the expected cost of violations.
The enactment of section 36 of the Competition Act in 1976
(following abandonment of the earlier double damages proposal) can be
interpreted as a recognition of the compensation rather than deterrence
97 Economic Critique, supra note 46 at 31-32.
98 See E.J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1995).
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rationale for private enforcement of our competition laws-most
plausibly on a corrective justice basis. The follow-on or piggy back
features of both section 36 of the Competition Act and section 4 of the
Clayton Act are also more consistent with a compensation rather than
deterrence rationale for private enforcement. Is there any less
persuasive case for applying this rationale to the reviewable practices
contained in Part VIII of the Act? First, it needs to be noted that
mergers and monopolies at the time of the enactment of section 36 fell
within the criminal provisions of theAct and were only transferred to the
category of reviewable practices in 1986, so that for the first decade of
the private damage remedy, it was designed to apply to two of the major
classes of reviewable practices today. Second, and conversely, it might
be argued that because the reviewable practices entail adjudication on a
rule-of-reason basis, in contrast to the criminal violations that arguably
entail more sharply defined forms of wrongdoing, it is inappropriate that
practices which are determined after the fact in most cases to be
breaches of the reviewable practice provisions should sustain claims for
compensation in respect of past behaviour. The argument, in short, is
that this entails a form of retroactive liability. While this argument is not
without force, we do not find it dispositive. In fact, many of the practices
that fall within the criminal prohibitions, at least in Canada, are not per
se illegal.
The conspiracy provision (now section 45) requires an "undue
lessening of competition," which the Supreme Court in R. v. Nova Scotia
Pharmaceutical Society held involved "a partial rule of reason."99 Other
criminal offences such as predatory pricing require proof that the prices
in question were "unreasonably low."100 Other offences, such as bid-
rigging and fixing interest rates on deposits or loans, are more clearlyper
se illegal. Thus, the distinction between per se illegality and
rule-of-reason review does not closely track the distinction between
criminal prohibitions and administratively reviewable practices.
Furthermore, in many other areas of the private law where
compensation is routinely awarded for wrongdoing, rule-of-reason
review, in effect, is required to determine liability. For example, in
negligence actions in tort law, a failure to take reasonable care is
99 [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606 at 650. Despite its "rule of reason" characteristics, the Court also held,
at 657, that the law (then s. 32(1)(c)) was not so vague that it violated the accused's right under s. 7
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, not to be deprived of liberty or security of the person
except in accordance with the principle of fundamental justice.
100 Competition Act, supra note 2, s. 50(1)(c).
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typically a pre-condition to liability and also typically requires
fact-intensive review of the impugned conduct in question ex post facto.
This is also the case in tort actions for nuisance, where unreasonable
exercise of property rights must be proved. However, neither in the torts
of negligence or nuisance, nor with respect to reviewable practices under
the Competition Act are the courts or the Competition Tribunal making
decisions in particular cases unconstrained by general legal
principles-that is to say, they are not simply making up the law
retrospectively out of whole cloth. Moreover, given that conduct that is
found to entail a violation has caused a loss, and given that the legal
system cannot make the loss go away, it is not clear why the equities
require that the successful plaintiff rather than the defendant should
have to bear this loss.
Thus, we conclude that, at the level of principle, the case for
compensation of parties injured by reviewable practices found to violate
Part VIII of the Competition Act is compelling, while the case for
structuring private enforcement remedies in this context to serve
deterrence ends is much less persuasive. We take this latter view
because, if policymakers were concerned to assign a priority to
deterrence with respect to reviewable practices, we accept one of the
implications that emerges from the recent scholarship on private
antitrust enforcement in the United States that an appropriately
structured fines regime is likely to be a much more efficient form of
deterrence than any other form of sanction, public or private.
Moreover, the American experience suggests serious conceptual
difficulties in designing a private enforcement regime that
simultaneously serves both deterrence and compensation rationales.
Asking a single policy instrument to serve multiple objectives is
often a prescription for policy incoherence. The fact that legislators in
Canada have not seen fit to attach any public sanctions to reviewable
practices, other than the possibility of preventing their continuance,
suggests that it would be a deep second-best response to the case for
deterrence to attempt to offset this decision through deterrence-oriented
private remedies. However, given this decision to eschew deterrence
objectives with respect to reviewable practices-in sharp contrast to
American antitrust law, where such practices may attract both publicly
enforced fines and privately enforced treble damage awards-it seems to
us that, at a minimum, legitimately aggrieved victims of practices found
to be anti-competitive under Part VIII of the Competition Act ought to
receive compensation for their injuries. In our view, this argues for
extending section 36 of theAct to reviewable practices, but vesting in the
tribunal, rather than the courts, the right to award compensation to
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private parties in the event that it finds a practice to violate the Act, in
addition to adopting orders designed to ensure the discontinuance of the
practice in future.
We are aware, of course, that the Competition Policy Bureau in
its Discussion Paper on proposed Competition Act amendments of June
1995 proposes only that private parties be entitled to apply directly to
the tribunal for injunctive (not compensatory) relief with respect to
reviewable practices that fall within Part VIII and that, even in this case,
mergers should probably be excluded from this regime. We note in this
respect that section 16 of the Clayton Act has provided private parties
with access to this form of relief from the courts since 1914 (with no
exception for mergers) and that this issue is regarded as so peripheral to
debates over private enforcement of antitrust laws in the United States
that it warrants a mere footnote in Elzinga and Breit's widely cited book
on the topic,lOl and less than a page in Herbert Hovenkamp's extensive
treatment of the subject. 2 The case for at least this degree of private
access to the Competition Tribunal seems to us to be unanswerable.
First, even injunctive relief that corrects the situation for the
future engages directly the corrective justice rationale for private rights
of action in respect of validated claims of wrongdoing.
Second, the Competition Policy Bureau has recently sustained
significant cuts to its enforcement budget. Over the past three years, its
operating budget has been reduced by about two million dollars and the
number of full-time-equivalent personnel reduced from 274 to 241.103
This has occurred at precisely the time when its responsibilities appear
to be expanding significantly, particularly with respect to industries that
were formerly publicly owned and/or closely regulated (mostly public
utilities) but where a combination of privatization and/or deregulation
has opened up the fact or possibility of competitive segments emerging
in these industries requiring the application of general framework
101 Antitrust Penalties, supra note 4 at 16, note 27.
102 H. Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Law Policy: The Law of Competition and its Practice (St.
Paul, Minn.: West, 1994) at 551.
103 The Bureau of Competition Policy grew steadily in size until the early 1990s. See Director
of Investigation and Research, Competition Act, Annual Report for the year ended March 31, 1988
(Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1988) at 36 ("authorized strength" of 255 person years). The
1989 Annual Report, at 41, listed authorized strength at 258 and the Bureau's annual budget at
$19,512,860; and the 1990 Annual Report, at 43, listed 261 full-time equivalent personnel. No
staffing numbers were provided in theAnnual Reports for 1991,1992, or 1993. As of 31 March 1994,
however, the Bureau had 241 full-time-equivalent personnel and an annual operating budget of
$19,326,000: Director of Investigation and Research, Competition Act, Annual Report (Ottawa:
Supply and Services Canada, 1995) at 12. This trend was expected by the authors to continue.
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competition laws rather than detailed, industry-specific regulation.10 4
Indeed, some of the critics of the Bureau's proposal to provide private
parties access to the tribunal for injunctive relief in respect of reviewable
practices have been prominent amongst those advocating a substantially
enlarged role for the Director in these sectors.lOS At a time of severe
fiscal restraint, it is disingenuous to suggest, as the Competition Law
section of the Canadian Bar Association did in its November 1995
submission to the Bureau on its reform proposals, that if public
enforcement is inadequate additional public funding should be sought
for the Bureau, when over the entire range of government functions,
from welfare to unemployment to education, individuals are being asked
to assume a larger responsibility for their own well-being. It is not
unreasonable to ask private parties aggrieved by alleged competition law
violations to do the same.
Third, because we have so limited an understanding of the
incentives operating on politicians and bureaucrats in contexts such as
the present, it is inconsistent with general norms of public accountability
to vest an enforcement monopoly in the Bureau and its political
overseers. It is particularly incongruous to maintain the virtues of a
public monopoly in the context of the enforcement of competition laws
whose primary aim is to redress the adverse social consequences of
private monopoly. In our view, the floodgates objection either to our
proposal that both compensatory and specific relief be available to
private parties with respect to reviewable practices or to the Bureau's
more limited proposal for specific relief only, and attendant concerns
over frivolous, vexatious, and harassing litigation and a consequent
"chill" on pro-competitive or competitively neutral conduct, carries
limited force. We appreciate that private enforcement mechanisms in
the present context, as in other civil contexts, may be employed for
privately advantageous strategic purposes that are antithetical to the
social welfare objective of the legislation. We view these concerns,
however, as warranting close attention to design variables that can
constrain such possibilities, rather than denying private rights of
enforcement altogether in all cases. These concerns are most legitimate
in the case of time-sensitive mergers where delays may undermine the
terms of the acquisition (in the case of stock acquisitions or
capitalizations) or generate damaging forms of uncertainty for
104 See Finkelstein & Quinn, supra note 84; and, Smith, supra note 15.
105 See L. Hunter et al., "All We Are Saying, Is Give Competition A Chance-The Role of
Competition Policy in Industries in Transition from Regulation to Competition" (Paper presented
at the University of Toronto, Faculty of Law, 8 December 1995) [unpublished].
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management, employees, suppliers, and customers of the merging
parties. This suggests a case for considerable caution in making interim
remedies available to private parties or, at the limit, the exclusion of
mergers altogether from the private enforcement regime (as the Bureau
proposes) until more experience develops with the regime. We note,
however, that injunctive relief, including interim relief, is available to
private parties with respect to mergers under section 16 of the Clayton
ActlO6 (although rarely invoked), and the Australian Trade Practices Act
permits private parties to seek declarations and divestitures in the case
of mergers (again rarely invoked), but not interim relief.
In general, the experience under section 36 of the Competition
Act, where private parties have the incentive of securing compensation
and can piggy back on prior convictions resulting from public
enforcement actions, as well as the Australian experience, suggest that
both our proposals and the Bureau's proposals are likely to yield a
modest net increase in proceedings before the tribunal relating to
reviewable practices. We recognize that some cases which the Director
might otherwise have brought will instead be brought by private parties,
while some new cases are likely to enter the system. American debates
over the treble damages remedy have little or no relevance to proposals
under debate in Canada. The combination of treble damages awards,
one-way costs rules, contingent fees, expansive class action procedures,
and civil jury trials describe an institutional context that is radically
different from that applicable to current Canadian proposals.
Having so concluded, we recognize that there are a number of
important design variables that must be addressed if our proposal is to
be operationalized in an efficient and equitable manner. In short, the
devil is largely in the detail. In a more extensive study of private
enforcement recently completed for the Competition Policy Bureau,10 7
we provide a detailed analysis of these issues. We merely summarize our
position on a number of these issues below.
V. PROCEDURAL AND REMEDIAL ISSUES
In this part, we identify procedural and remedial features which
can maximize the potential of private actions to compensate and
106 Supra note 8.
107 V. Roach & M.J. Trebilcock, Private Party Access to the Competition Tribunal, Prepared for
the Amendments Unit, Competition Policy Bureau, Industry Canada (Hull, Que.: 7 May 1996) at
36-93 [unpublished].
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regulate while minimizing the social costs of private enforcement, most
notably the danger of strategic behaviour at odds with the goals of
competition law and the disruption of the Director's enforcement policy.
The remedies available to private plaintiffs are likely to determine the
efficacy of the private enforcement regime and will be discussed below.
Topics ranging from the appropriate test for standing, pre-trial
procedures, and interim and final remedies are examined separately in
this section, but they are all interrelated. A holistic approach which
monitors and influences the behaviour of litigants at all stages of the
enforcement process is necessary.
A. Standing
The Bureau's June 1995 Discussion Paper proposed that standing
be granted either on the basis that a litigant would be "directly affected
in their business or property" or "materially affected."08 The latter
phrase is preferable because it could be interpreted to grant indirect
purchasers standing on the basis that they have been materially, but
perhaps not directly, affected by the alleged anti-competitive behaviour.
A direct injury test is underinclusive in achieving corrective justice
because it prevents ultimate consumers from seeking compensation for
antitrust injuries they have suffered. It is also underinclusive from a
deterrence perspective because it relies exclusively on direct purchasers
to act as private attorneys general even though they may be reluctant to
bring actions against their suppliers. The rationale for limiting standing
to direct purchasers is related almost entirely to concerns about multiple
recovery of damages. A more finely tailored approach would be to allow
indirect purchasers standing to bring an action, but to exercise caution in
awarding damages to minimize the risk of duplicate recovery.
If damages are not available as a remedy, there may be a case for
an even broader standing test that permits public interest standing by
consumer, employee, and industry associations that may have a genuine
and substantial interest in a matter and a superior ability to litigate than
some individuals who are directly or materially affected. The
requirement that a plaintiff be affected by the impugned practice makes
sense if the purpose is to achieve corrective justice. If deterrence or the
prevention of unjust enrichment are legitimate purposes, however, any
litigant should be able to act as a private attorney general.
108 Discussion Paper, supra note 1 at 23.
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B. Intervention
Parties who are directly affected by private enforcement
proceedings in the Competition Tribunal should have a right of
intervention, including a right to advance claims for compensation, once
liability has been established. For example, a direct purchaser should be
able to participate in an action brought by an indirect purchaser and vice
versa. This will help to reduce the risk of duplicate recovery of damages.
A case can be made that broader public interest intervention should also
be allowed because private prosecutors may have more limited research
and investigative capabilities than public prosecutors. The tribunal,
however, should have discretion to limit the extent of the participatory
rights so that public interest intervention does not delay hearings and
impose excessive costs on the parties.
C. The Director's Powers
One of the major weaknesses of private enforcement is that it
can disrupt coherent enforcement policies based on the prudent and
reasoned exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Some of the positive
values of public enforcement policy can be preserved by requiring the
Director to be given notice of all private enforcement actions. The
Director could be given the opportunity to pre-empt the private
proceeding by commencing his or her own action or negotiating a
consent decree. In any event, the Director should have full rights of
intervention in privately commenced actions, including participation in
discovery, the calling of evidence, the cross-examination of witnesses,
and perhaps even the power to appeal a decision.
In the case of time-sensitive transactions such as mergers, there
may be a case for allowing private litigants access to the tribunal to
commence a challenge to a merger, but allowing the Director to issue a
stay of the proceedings, if he or she views this as expedient. The
Director should, however, be required to present reasons for the stay,
thus enhancing public accountability for the decision. Requiring the
Director to give reasons for a stay also satisfies concerns that a decision
not to prosecute was a product of inertia and neglect, as opposed to a
considered exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The power to stay some
proceedings would undermine some but not all of the value of private
enforcement. A private plaintiff could still commence an action knowing
that the worst that can occur is that the Director would have to explain
his or her reasons on the record before entering a stay.
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D. Preventing Frivolous and Improper Private Actions
Efficient and effective procedures to screen out frivolous and
improper private actions are necessary because of the time-sensitive
nature of much commercial activity and the risk of strategically
motivated private actions unrelated to the legitimate purposes of
competition law. In the United States, summary judgments have been
awarded with increasing frequency in antitrust cases.1 09 A mandatory
summary judgment procedure can force plaintiffs not only to plead the
legal requirements of a reviewable practice, but also to produce affidavit
evidence to support these allegations. In turn, a respondent can be given
an early opportunity to file affidavits to support its case that its activities
are pro-competitive. A trial would only be necessary if there was a
genuine conflict about the material facts. Such a procedure could also
serve as a case management device and a convenient cut-off for the
application of loser-pay costs rules.
E. Costs Rules
Along with a mandatory summary judgment procedure, cost
awards can also deter frivolous and strategic litigation provided that the
strategic benefits do not outweigh the risks of an adverse cost award.
However, loser-pay cost rules also present a risk of deterring meritorious
but innovative litigation, especially if a plaintiff litigates on behalf of a
diffuse group or is not able to obtain a damages award or the costs of
litigation. The conventional loser-pays rule may be the appropriate rule
to apply to the preliminary stages of litigation up to and including the
mandatory summary judgment procedure, but once a case has passed
summary judgment, there may be good reasons, depending on the legal
context, for applying a variety of no-way and one-way cost rules.
109 S. Calkins, "Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss and Other Examples of Equilibrating
Techniques in the Antitrust System" (1986) 74 Geo. L.J. 1065 at 1130-31: S.D. Helsel,
"Note-Preventing Predatory Abuses in Litigation Between Business Competitors" (1995) 36 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 1135; Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Se,. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 at 763-64 (1984);
Matsushita Eletronic v. Zenith Radio, 106 S. Ct. 1348 at 1357 (1986); and Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown
and Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 at 2598 (1993).
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F. Discovery
Private litigants will have to rely on discovery because they will
not have the same investigative powers as the Director. Nonetheless,
discovery can be abused to prolong a case for strategic reasons, to gain
access to confidential information, and to impose unwarranted costs on a
party.110 For this reason, it may be necessary to require the parties at an
early stage to list the documents they rely upon and to assign a member
of the tribunal to supervise the discovery process as part of a case
management process.
G. Limitation Periods
A clearly worded general limitation period, such as three years
from when damages were suffered, but subject to judicial discretion to
extend the period in exceptional cases, is necessary.111  Private
enforcement which follows on from public enforcement can partially be
controlled by either extending or not extending the limitation period for
the time consumed by the Director's enforcement efforts. Follow-on
litigation could result in over-deterrence, but still be required to achieve
corrective justice.
H. Supervising Settlements
There is a danger that settlements between private parties may
not always advance the broader purposes of the Act and competition
policy. In particular, settlements may be collusive and have
anti-competitive effects. The tribunal already reviews consent
agreements to which the Director has agreed,112 and a similar review
may be warranted for settlements of actions between private parties.
110 J.R. Withrow & R.P. Larm, "The 'Big' Antitrust Case: 25 Years of Sisyphean Labor"
(1976) 62 Cornell L. Rev. 1 at 26-28; M.M. Blecher & C.E. Carlo, "Toward More Effective
Handling of Complex Antitrust Cases" [1980] Utah L. Rev. 727 at 748; and Finkelstein & Quinn,
supra note 84 at 29.
111 Australian Law Reform Commission, Compliance with the Trade Practices Act, 1974, vol. 2
(Report No. 68) (Sydney: The Commission, 1994) at 61.
112 In Director of Investigation and Research v. Palm Dairies Ltd. (1986), 12 C.P.R. (2d) 540 at
547 (Comp. Trib.), Reed J. stated that "when the Tribunal is asked to issue a consent order it is
incumbent on it to satisfy itself that the order will be effective to accomplish, with due regard to the
circumstances of the case, the objectives of the Act" [emphasis in original].
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I. Interim Remedies
Preventing the Competition Tribunal from awarding interim
relief will make litigation less attractive and may produce countervailing
pressures to expand common law actions to include conduct that can be
assessed as a reviewable practice. However, there is a risk that private
plaintiffs will seek interim relief for strategic reasons and that such relief
may restrain pro-competitive behaviour. This risk may justify preserving
the Director's exclusive monopoly over requests for interim relief, at
least in the merger context. On the other hand, the doctrine for granting
interim relief, at least in other contexts, can be tightened11 3 and plaintiffs
can be required to undertake to pay damages that respondents suffer
because of the grant of interim relief that is subsequently overturned. If
interim relief is not available, respondents may have to pay damages, at
least for injuries they inflict during the litigation process.
J. Damages
From the perspective of corrective justice, treble or double
damages are an unjustified windfall to the plaintiff. As discussed in Part
IV, above, the fine is a better instrument of deterrence if only because
the resources devoted to public enforcement can be more carefully
controlled than those devoted to private enforcement. Single damages
can both compensate private applicants for harms caused by reviewable
practices and give them an incentive to bring an action. The calculation
of single damages can be complex, especially if the plaintiff must
establish an antitrust injury that would not have been suffered by the
results of normal competition.1 4 The tribunal will have to take steps to
prevent duplicate recovery from a respondent of losses that fall along a
chain of distribution.
K. Compliance Orders
Compliance orders are aimed at preventing further violations
and ensuring compliance in the future, not repairing past violations.
113 See for example Competition Act, supra note 2, ss. 33, 100.
114 B.C. McDonald, "Private Actions and the Combines Investigation Act" in Prichard,
Stanbury & Wilson, eds., supra note 72, 195 at 208-09; and J.B. Musgrove, "Civil Actions and the
Competition Act" (1994) 16 Advocates' Q. 94 at 110.
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They will remain an important remedy under private enforcement, but
the tribunal should ensure that plaintiffs do not obtain orders that go
beyond the purposes of the Act or impose unnecessary costs on
respondents. Settlements and consent orders will also play an important
role, but again the tribunal will need to be vigilant in supervising
settlements and issuing consent orders because settlements between
private parties cannot be assumed to accord with the purposes of the
Act.
L. Choice of Forum
While we have principally examined the strengths and
weaknesses of private enforcement of competition law with particular
attention to the reviewable practices contained in Part VIII of the
Competition Act, many of the design issues identified above may also be
relevant to private actions which are presently allowed under section 36
of the Act with respect to criminal competition offenses and failures to
comply with an order of the Competition Tribunal. Should private
parties be allowed access to the tribunal with respect to reviewable
matters, there may also be a case for allowing or even requiring private
parties to utilize the same procedure for section 36 claims. In any event,
some attention should be given to integrating, or at least harmonizing,
features of the private enforcement regime with respect to criminal
offences and our proposed private enforcement regime with respect to
reviewable practices.
Restrictions placed on private enforcement in the tribunal, such
as the present prosecutorial monopoly of the Director, or even
restrictions on remedies available under a new regime of private
enforcement before the tribunal, may produce a countervailing demand
to expand common law actions and remedies in the ordinary courts.
From the perspective of competition law policy, it may be better to allow
and even require all private enforcement before an expert Tribunal with
specialized procedural rules rather than forcing it into the ordinary
courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
The case for allowing private party access to the Competition
Tribunal is compelling. Plaintiffs can seek corrective justice in the
tribunal and, in so doing, supplement the enforcement resources of the
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Director and promote accountability for the Director's decisions not to
proceed with reviewable matters. The major weaknesses of private
enforcement, namely its ability to disrupt the Director's enforcement
policy and to allow private litigants to impose strategic costs on others,
can be addressed by careful design of the private right of action, as our
proposals in Part V attempt to demonstrate. Public debates could more
productively focus on these design issues rather than abstract,
ideological, or self-serving arguments about whether private
enforcement of competition laws is desirable or undesirableper se. On
this issue in the end, it is difficult, if not impossible, to defend a public
monopoly on the enforcement of laws whose central raison d'etre is
redressing the evils of private monopoly.
